St. John's Law Review
Volume 38, May 1964, Number 2

Article 7

Federal Jurisdiction--Abstention Doctrine--Return to District Court
Precluded When Federal Claim Unreservedly Submitted to State
Court (England v. Louisiana State Bd. Of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1964 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

apparent conflict between the Smith case and prior decisions of
the Supreme Court on this question of excluded evidence may
result in the need for further clarification by the Supreme Court
of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The reasoning behind
the Smith case presents a novel approach to the evidentiary value
of information procured during an illegal detention and may
provide a new basis for determining whether or not particular
forms of evidence fall within the exclusionary rule.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION - ABSTENTION DOCTRINE - RETURN TO
DISTRICT COURT PRECLUDED WHEN FEDERAL CLAIM UNRESERVEDLY
SUBMITTED TO STATE COURT. - Appellants, graduates of chiro-

practic schools, sought to practice without complying with the
requirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act.' They brought
an action in the federal district court 2 for an injunction and
declaration that the act as applied to them was unconstitutional.
The court, sua sponte, invoked the doctrine of abstention and
referred the parties to the state courts since the question presented
involved a principle of Louisiana law not yet decided by that
state. The claims were unreservedly submitted to the state court
and after final judgment was entered against the appellants they
attempted to return to the district court. Respondent's motion
to dismiss was granted by the district court on the ground of
res judicata. 3 On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and held that a litigant foregoes his right under the
abstention doctrine to return to the district court by unreservedly
submitting his federal claims to the state courts. However, this
rule was not applied against the appellants because they had
reasonably relied on the mistaken view that they were required
to litigate their federal claims in the state courts. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
The doctrine of abstention, a court-made rule, is a comparatively
new concept in federal jurisdiction. 4 The doctrine as applied
ILA. RFv. STAT. ANN.

§§37:1261-1290 (1950).

2 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 F. Supp.
121 (E.D. La. 1960).
3 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La. 1961), rezfd, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
4 For treatments of the abstention doctrine, see 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 64 (1960) ; IA

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 0.203 (2d ed. 1961); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered. 37

TEXAs L. REV. 815 (1959); Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal
Court, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1358 (1960); Note, Judicial Abstention From The
Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749 (1959): Note,
Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
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to a federal question contemplates that a federal court shall stay,
but not relinquish, jurisdiction in cases involving unsettled questions
of state law. The parties are involuntarily directed to a state
forum for a preliminary determination of the state law, and then
return to the federal court for a decision on the constitutional
issue.
Prior to 1941 it had been assumed that when the jurisdiction
of a federal court was properly invoked, it was the duty of
that court to decide all matters before it on the theory that
the right of a party to litigate issues properly before the court
was not to be denied. 5 However, the case of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins,6 which provided that federal courts should apply substantive state law, raised the question of what a federal court
should do when the applicable state law was not clear. In light
of that question the United States Supreme Court in 1941 decided
the case of Railroad Comin'n v. Pullman Co., 7 in which it first
enunciated the doctrine of federal abstention.
In that case the Pullman Company sought injunctive relief
claiming that its federal rights had been violated by an order
of the Railroad Commission of Texas. The district court granted
the injunction, but was reversed by the Supreme Court which
held the lower court had abused its discretion. It remanded the
case and ordered the district court to stay judgment until an
interpretation of the Railroad Commission's order could be made
by the Texas courts. The rationale of the decision was that a
state court determination in which the plaintiff prevailed could
conceivably eliminate the necessity of deciding the federal question.
Reading the Texas .statutes and Texas decisions as outsiders without special
competence in Texas Law, we would have little confidence in our independent
judgment regarding the application of that law to the present situation ...
[N]o matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it
cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination.8

In subsequent attempts to avoid conflict between state and federal
courts, the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine of abstention
on numerous occasions. 9
The first major extension of the doctrine occurred in CIO v.
Windsor.a0 This case involved the interpretation of a state statute
5Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
6304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7312 U.S. 496 (1941).
8 Id. at 499.
9 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)
(abstention made mandatory on the district courts) ; Lassiter v. Northhampton, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959);
Meridian v. Southern Bell, 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Leiter v. United States,
352 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Alhertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
10 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
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which attempted to prevent civic employees from joining labor
unions. In an action brought to restrain enforcement of the
statute, the district court invoked the abstention doctrine.1
This
holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 12 Plaintiffs then
instituted a declaratory judgment proceeding in the state court,
but did not litigate their federal claims. After the Alabama
Supreme Court found that the statute applied to the union,' 3 the
plaintiffs returned to the district court which held that the statute
as applied was constitutional. 1 4 On appeal the United States
Supreme Court stated that the abstention doctrine should have
been applied a second time since the state court was not aware
of the federal claim, and therefore, the district court had erred
in deciding on the merits.' 5 The Alabama courts, however, refused
to reconsider the claim. As a result of this decision, litigants
faced a twofold problem. They could not restrict their state court
adjudication to purely local issues, and yet, if they litigated their
entire claim, they would be denied the right to return to the
federal court on the ground of res judicata.
In 1963 the Supreme Court decided NAACP v. Button,'0
wherein the plaintiffs sought a complete adjudication of all issues
in the state court after the federal district court had invoked
the abstention doctrine. Rather than returning to the district
court, the plaintiffs chose to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.
They were then confronted with the defense that the Supreme
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the
district court, by invoking the doctrine of abstention, had never
relinquished its jurisdiction. The Court declared, however, that
although the federal district court had formally retained jurisdiction,
since the parties sought a complete and final determination in
the state courts, they nevertheless had the right to appeal directly
to the Supreme Court. Litigants could thus, at their option,
waive their rights to a final adjudication by the lower federal
courts.
In the instant case the Court has demonstrated that there are
fundamental objections to compelling a litigant to accept a state
court determination once he has originally chosen a federal forum.
The Court reasoned that a federal court, when properly appealed
to, is obligated to hear the case.17 The Court stated that although
1 CIO v. Windsor, 116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd, 347

U.S. 901 (1954).

CIO v. Windsor, 347
13 CIO v. Windsor, 262
14 CIO v. Windsor, 146
364 (1957).
25 CIO v. Windsor, 353
16 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
17 Siler v. Louisville &
12

U.S. 901 (1954).
Ala. 285, 78 So. 2d 646 (1955).
F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1956), reV'd. 353 U.S.
U.S. 364 (1957).
Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
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a hearing in a federal court is available through direct appeal from
the state courts to the Supreme Court,' 8 an appeal "is an inadequate substitute for the initial District Court determination
to which the litigant is entitled." 19
The Court attempted to clarify its holding in the Windsor
case by indicating that although a party may elect to forego his
right to return to the district court, he is not required to litigate
his federal claims in the state courts. Under Windsor, therefore,
a plaintiff would only need to inform the state court of his federal
claim so as to enable that court to construe the statute in light
of it. The majority also pointed out, however, that state courts
are often reluctant to decide only a segment of the litigation,20
and when this contingency arises a litigant must reserve his right
to return to the federal court by an express statement in the
record, or it will be deemed waived. Although plaintiffs in the
instant case made no such reservation, they were permitted to
return to the district court since they relied on what had been
the accepted interpretation of Windsor.21 As has been indicated,
however, the Court will not afford this courtesy to future litigants.
It would appear that the decision reached by the majority will
deprive many litigants of a federal forum through a procedural
technicality. First, it should be reiterated that the application of
the doctrine of abstention results in an involuntary referral to
a state court. In light of this, it would appear unreasonable to
deprive a plaintiff of his right to a factual determination in a
federal court because he failed to make an express reservation in
the record.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,
noted that this deprivation may have great significance in the area
of civil rights. He points out that civil rights actions are normally
brought in the federal courts because of their history of protecting
the rights of minority groups. Basically the parties are in the
federal court to avoid the local prejudice which is sometimes
implicit in the findings of a state court.2 2 Deprivation of a federal
forum through a procedural technicality could, therefore, work a
great hardship on many civil rights litigants.
Another problem will arise if the state court reaches a decision on the merits after the plaintiff has reserved the right
18 The Court was merely reiterating its holding in NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
19 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
416 (1964).
20 But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961).
This statute provides that
the Florida courts may render advisory opinions on questions certified by
the federal courts.
21 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
422 (1964).
22 Id. at 434-35 (concurring opinion).
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to return to the district court. Since the plaintiff must be permitted
to return, 23 there could conceivably be a re-litigation of the facts.
Such a situation could clearly lead to more federal-state friction
than the abstention doctrine was intended to eliminate. In holding
that a party is entitled to a federal determination, the Court
apparently opens the door to this duplicity of litigation. Finally,
a contrary finding of fact in the federal court may lead to a
different interpertation of the statute in question.
24
In effect, abstention is primarily a defendant's doctrine,
since a major concern to any prospective complainant is the cost
of litigation. The burden of financing a single litigation is impressive, that of a double litigation may be prohibitive. Time
may also be a significant factor. In Windsor, for example, after
five years of litigation, including two appeals to the Supreme
Court and two to the highest court in Alabama, the parties still
had no decision on the merits.235 Many plaintiffs will have neither
the patience nor the finances to endure such lengthy litigations.
The purpose of the doctrine of abstention has been the avoidance of federal-state conflict. But it has been suggested that
abstention works against rather than toward national unity 2 6 In
order to avoid conflict it was proposed as early as 1948 that Congress eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts "in all cases
that present a claim of federal invalidity in state legislative or
administrative action where . . . a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy is available in the state courts." 27 Perhaps a more ap-

propriate solution would be the elimination of the abstention doctrine
entirely. An alternative would be for the federal court to decide
all issues in the first instance, adding as a postscript that if at any
time in the future the state courts interpret the problem differently,
the parties may apply to the federal courts for such relief as
may be appropriate. 2
In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas,
abstention dilutes the stature of the federal district courts, making
them secondary tribunals in the administration of justice.29

23

Id. at 421.

Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 Am U.L. REv. 5 (1963).
See also NAACP v. Button, supra note 18; Harriman v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1959).
26 Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights, 40 T-cAs L.
Rav. 211 (1961).
27 Weschler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROa. 216, 229 (1948).
28 See Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934).
29
Harriman v. NAACP, supra note 25, at 180 (dissenting opinion).
24
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